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The financial crisis has changed the story of European integration. The Pandora’s box opened by 
the European debt crisis generated unprecedented forms of legal integration and, especially in the 
banking sector, it has accelerated the use of administrative arrangements. The financial crisis has 
pushed European integration towards new models of integrated administration, where who does 
what often becomes an issue with no predictable response. The power of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to apply national laws in its capacity of Single Supervisor under the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) - the so-called Banking Union - is a clear-cut example of the deep legal changes 
introduced because of the crisis. 
The book edited by Edoardo Chiti and Giulio Vesperini focuses on the nature of these changes, 
their potential reach and legal implications. From the title itself, the book aims to point out that 
financial integration is primarily administrative in nature. By approaching financial integration 
through the lens of administrative law, the book gives a major methodological contribution to the 
study of financial integration itself. Compared to sector-specific approaches, administrative law 
provides the instruments for the understanding of the institutional design and the procedural 
functioning of EU financial regulation. Administrative law allows the unpacking of the institutional 
framework where the functions of regulation, supervision and resolution are performed and this 
makes the difference in the interpretation of the problems embedded in financial regulation. In the 
Introduction, editors emphasise that the book targets the rationale of institutional arrangements and 
tasks. They are also well aware that this methodological approach explains something more about 
the stage of European integration, something that goes beyond the issues of financial integration. 
The ‘unpacking’ purpose of the book allows the identification of structures and processes which 
(mutatis mutandis) might replicate in other contexts of EU law and regulation. 
By relying on the administrative law approach, the book clearly outlines the legal tensions 
embedded in the ‘architecture of financial integration’. Inconsistencies in the accountability 
frameworks, competence overlaps, and difficult coordination between the Eurozone and non-
Eurozone countries in the internal market are identified as factors of complexity and instability in 
the administrative system. The volume perceives these issues as extremely relevant challenges to 
the functioning of the European system of financial integration. 
The structure of the book reflects this administrative law approach. Being divided into two parts, 
the first part sets the scene of financial integration, whereas the second one goes deeper into the 
administrative law analysis. Part one comprises three chapters that illustrate the functions pursued 
by financial integration. Regulation, supervision and resolution are analysed as key tasks that need 
to be addressed within a common legal framework at the EU level. Part two comprises six chapters 
that analyse how these functions are performed, and uncovers the complexity of European financial 
integration. 
The first part of the book focuses on EU regulatory powers in the banking sector, the different speed 
models of EU financial supervision and the emergent framework of banking recovery and 
resolution. When highlighting the powers of the different institutions and agencies involved in the 
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SSM and in the internal banking market, this part provides an overview of the unsolved 
architectural issues that affect their exercise. Deeper integration is pursued at the expense of 
organisational coherence in the allocation of tasks and responsibilities. The chapter by Enrico 
Leonardo Camilli shows how the constitutional coherence in the relationship between EU 
institutions and EU agencies in the Banking Union is particularly pushed to the limits. The ECB as 
Single Supervisor under the SSM is subject to the European Banking Authority (EBA)’s regulatory 
powers in the internal market and for the development of the single rulebook on banking 
supervision. The institutional design does not follow a hierarchical order, but it focuses on the 
functional missions of the individual institutions and agencies. A functional order based on the 
specificity of the regulatory objectives rather than a hierarchical one based on the nature of the 
regulators leads the relations between the different administrations. 
The exercise of the function of supervision adds another layer of complexity. As the chapter by 
Maurizia de Bellis clearly illustrates, supervision is pursued at a different speed according to the 
participation in the centralised banking supervision in the Eurozone or the still national supervision 
in non-participating countries. In addition, EU agencies detain direct supervisory powers under 
specific conditions (e.g., in emergency situations) and in specific matters (e.g., ESMA on credit 
rating agencies and trade repositories). This adds another level of differentiation to financial 
integration. 
The picture becomes even more complex in the area of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), 
where banking recovery and resolution is performed by a number of EU and national institutions - 
namely, national resolution and supervisory authorities, the ECB and in the case of resolution, the 
Commission and the Council - under the coordination of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The 
chapter by Giuseppe Sciascia shows that the complexity of the designed institutional interplay aims 
to detect and intervene in a timely manner to manage the crisis of financial institutions, which might 
be underestimated if the same authority exercises both supervisory and resolution tasks. As the use 
of public resources might be relevant, the fiscal authorities also have a key role in the resolution 
mechanism, while they generally have a marginal position in supervision. 
The second part of the book part brings out and pushes forward the envisaged administrative 
approach to financial integration. The focus is on the different models of administrative integration 
and how they apply in the different areas of financial integration. The first three chapters of this part 
analyse these issues in the banking sector. The chapter by Fabio Giglioni deconstructs the SSM and 
the SRM as new models of administrative integration. Giglioni identifies a variety of administrative 
law approaches to integration that coexist in a complex institutional design: the separation of duties 
and the allocation of exclusive competence to the ECB in the SSM and to the SRB in the SRM; the 
supremacy of the ECB over national authorities in the supervisory function and of the SRB in the 
recovery and resolution function; the collaboration of national authorities to the ECB decision-
making; the cooperation between national authorities and the ECB or the SRB in the exchange of 
staff members and information. Alongside these consolidated models of administrative integration, 
the already-mentioned ECB’s substitution powers in the application of national law represent an 
epochal change. By giving the ECB the competence to also apply some national discretionary 
powers, the reputational strength of the ECB beats the traditional trust of the EU legislator towards 
the national administrative capacities and this broadens the mechanisms of administrative 
integration. However, the coexistence of different models of integration in the same framework and 




The chapter by Marco Pacini focuses on the coordination of national authorities, ECB and the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in the financial supervision as a key tool of 
administrative integration aimed at ensuring the credibility of financial markets. It analyses 
coordination both as an outcome of financial supervision and as a process. In the first case, 
coordination is the result of the organisation of the supervisory function, whereas in the second case 
it is a possible pattern of the organisational structure. When analysing the current declination of 
multi-layered coordination in the financial governance (cross-policy; cross-sector; cross-country; 
and cross-function), Pacini shows a variety of coordination techniques. Even if the regulatory 
framework evolved towards a higher level of coordination, nonetheless some resistance remains and 
it has its roots in the degree of discretion left to national authorities, in the level of technical 
legitimacy and in the degree of cross-sector institutional integration. Pacini envisages possible 
means to address the remaining resistance in the further harmonisation of supervision and recovery, 
in the exchange of best practices and staff members and in more pressure on the adoption of joint 
actions. 
The chapter by Andrea Magliari highlights the administrative law issues embedded in the 
coexistence of a two-speed integration in the banking sector: internal market integration pursued 
under the harmonising guide of the EBA in the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 
and the centralised supervision of the ECB under the SSM. In the micro-prudential supervision, the 
cohabitation issues of the EBA with the ECB leave open the question of the legal relationship 
between the SSM and the ESFS. In the macro-prudential supervision, the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB)’s mandate and the ECB’s macro-prudential tasks within the SSM shows some 
complementarity that requires coordination. Information exchange and soft law powers are the main 
instruments of administrative coordination, but the intensification of this connection might 
contribute to enhancing synergies between micro- and macro- prudential supervision. This would 
enhance the credibility of the ESRB as an institution, but this might also imperil the effectiveness of 
the ESRB in the supervision of systemic risks. 
The subsequent two chapters by Giuseppe Sciascia and by Caroline Lequesne-Roth and Arnaud van 
Waeyenberge unpack the administrative law issues of financial regulation in the area of credit rating 
agencies (CRAs). As CRAs played a key role in the financial crisis, their regulation is crucial for 
the effective design of secure financial markets. Sciascia focuses on the EU regulatory approach to 
credit rating agencies (CRAs), with the aim of positioning the regulatory issues of rating in the 
broader understanding of the functions performed by CRAs in global financial markets; namely, the 
provision of information to the market (signalling function), the use of reliability as a benchmark if 
rating is included in financial regulation (gatekeeping-regulatory function), and the structure of 
financial products (advisory-engineering function). When discussing the consistency between these 
functions and the EU regulatory goals, Sciascia points out the novelty of the centralisation of EU 
supervision on CRAs under the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the impact of 
harmonisation and the new levels of coordination between the national supervisory authorities and 
ESMA. By elaborating on recent cases, the chapter further explores the issue of liability of CRAs as 
based on the existence of a substantial link between the issuance of a poor rating and the damage to 
a company. 
Caroline Lequesne-Roth and Arnaud van Waeyenberge build on Sciascia’s chapter and it highlights 
the foundations and the perspectives of the current regulatory framework. By comparing and 
contrasting the EU regulatory model with the American experience, the chapter envisages some 
critical issues. First, the attempt of public authorities to control CRAs is destined to be frustrated by 
the limited enforcement instruments at their disposal. The lack of in-depth control and the necessity 
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to rely on the information provided by CRAs themselves weakens the effort to influence rating. 
Second, competition in rating markets can support this effort as the emergence of a counter-power 
inside the market can increase the quality of rating. However, this scenario presupposes both huge 
financial and human resources for the establishment of regional CRAs and time for the development 
of their credibility. Third and most likely, the intervention of the judiciary balances power and 
shares responsibilities. When also redistributing burdens on CRAs, judicial review might have a 
financial and reputational impact on CRAs. 
The final chapter addresses another area of financial integration; that is, credit intermediation 
performed by non-bank institutions, generally included under the label of ‘shadow banking’. This 
chapter by Dalit Flaiszhaker analyses the proposed EU regulation on Money Market Funds 
(MMFs), which are financial instruments offering short-term cash management. These investment 
funds were exposed to the financial crisis and the sequence of runs on funds infected other parts of 
the financial system. As these instruments are strongly interlinked with the banking system, macro-
prudential supervision cannot ignore this ‘shadow’ portion of the market. However, Flaiszhaker 
shows that the proposed regulation is still focused on the improvement of the demands from banks, 
underestimating the importance of other financial institutions. He outlines the two main problems of 
the proposed regulation. First, it is not able to effectively prevent run on MMFs, because it only 
contributes to enhancing MMFs’ solvency, but not to reducing their risk creating activity. In 
addition, regulatory arbitrage between banks and MMFs might encourage the transfer of dangerous 
activities from banks to MMFs without effectively solving the exposure problems. 
The strong focus of EU regulation on banking is clearly reflected in the book. As the editors make 
clear, the administrative innovation underway in the banking sector is unprecedented in the EU. The 
level of (centralised) integration achieved under the Banking Union even goes beyond what has 
been done in the area of competition law. Even if banking is at the core of financial integration, EU 
regulation also covers other problematic sectors, such as insurance and pension schemes. The book 
misses the chance to investigate the multiple legal issues of the implementation of the Solvency II 
directive: for instance, the structural differences in national insurance markets and the difficulty in 
harmonising the sector, the powers of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) and the importance of its guidelines as interim measures during the long and troubled 
period needed to make the directive enter into force. 
Nonetheless, the book succeeds in giving the flavour of the remarkable changes underway in the EU 
administrative system. It pinpoints the further development of institutionalised administrative 
cooperation in the financial markets, the growing centralisation of competences at the EU level and 
the expanding autonomy of administrative integration in the Eurozone area as the major issues in 
the current transformations. Significantly enough, however, the book does not engage in uncovering 
any general conclusion: since the Introduction, the book gives an overhead image of the current 
phenomena, but it does not offer the key to their interpretation. This might suggest that probably it 
is still too early for elaborating on the direction of EU administrative integration. The book has the 
merit to indicate unambiguously that financial integration results in unavoidable administrative law 
issues. It will be up to future research to nurture the ambition to interpret these developments and 
the perspectives of EU administrative integration. 
